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ARBITRAGE ANDTHESAVINGS BEHAVIOR OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
ABSTRAGI
The federal tax code creates strong incentives for tax arbitrage activity
on thepart ofstategovernments.This arbitrageactivityisillegal and
previous research has typically assumed that the constraint against arbitrage
activityisbinding. Thispaperexplicitlyteststhispropositionby
considering whetherfinancial assetholdings increaseastheyieldspread
between taxable and tax exempt securities rises.Using a data set on 40 state
governments over a 7year period,Ifind that there is a significant response
to changes in the yield spread.One implication of these resultsisthat the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 which made even greater efforts to curb arbitrage




Princeton, NJ 08544-1017I Introduction
One by—product of the tax exemption granted to municipal bonds is the
opportunity for arbitrage by state and local governments.A state government,
for example, has clear incentivestoissue a tax exempt bond atrate r,
invest the proceeds at taxable rate r and earn the difference r_rm, the yield
spread between taxable and tax exempt bonds
This practice isillegal and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has made
vigorous efforts over the past 15 years to prevent state and local governments
from earning arbitrage profits.Previous research on the financial behavior
ofstateandlocalgovernments has assumedthattheIRSlimitationson
arbitragearebinding.Thispaperconsidersthatquestiondirectlyby
measuring the responsiveness of financial asset holdings to changes in the
yield spread between taxable and ax exempt securities.As the yield spread
increases, there are greater incentivesto engageinactivities which allow
assets and debt to be accumulated while avoiding IRS penalties for arbitrage.
To test this,Iemploy a panel data set on forty state governments over a
seven year period prior to the TaxReformAct of 1986 (TRA86).
Stategovernments arestudiedforseveralreasons.First,they are
significantholdersoffinancialassets.Infiscalyear1987theyheld
two-thirds of the $1048 billion stock of state and local government financial
assets.Second,tothe extent thatsophisticated accounting practices are
required to engage in arbitrage successfully, state governments may be better
able to carry out arbitrage.
The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that the IRS has not been
very successful in its efforts to halt arbitrage.Thus, at the margin states
1respondtoincreasesintheyieldspread by holdinggreater amounts of
financial assets.Whfle TRA86 attempts to curtafl arbitrage activity further,
its basic approach is flawed and is likely to be ineffective.
This has implications which go beyond thisparticular issue.Ithas
becomeincreasinglypopulartoplacelegalrestrictionsongovernmental
activities. InadditiontothearbitrageregWations,examplesinclude
Propositions 13 and 21/2,andbalanced budget laws at the state and local
level, and the Grarnm—Rudman—Hollings Law at the federal level.The evidence
inthispaper provides additiona' evidence that these legallimitationsare
exceedingly difficult to enforce and suggests that some other approach to the
problems underlying the limitations may be needed'.In the conclusion,I
briefly mention an alternative solution to the arbitrage problem.
The next section of this paper gives some background on the growth and
compositionoffinancialassetsheld bystate andlocalgovernments and
explainssomeoftheavailablearbitrage opportunities.A sectionfollows
which details an econometric mode' totestfor the presence ofarbitrage
effects followed by a section of resuks.A brief conclusion ends the paper.
II. Arbitrage and Asset Accumulation
At the end of fisca' year 1987,state governments held $696 billionin
cash and securities2.The build up cannot be sokly attributed to an effort
tofundpensionliabilitiesasassetsheMinnon—insurancetrustfund
accounts also increased substantiafly —to$253 billion by the end of1987.
Over the period from 1977 through 1985, the stock of financial assets grew at
1The experience at the federal level with the Gramm—Rudman-Hollings Law
provides another example.While the letter of the aw has been complied with,
the spirit has certainty been vio'ated.
2All asset and debt figures are par value as reported in the U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Government Finance publications for various years.
2an annual rate of14.5% while long term debt grew at an annual rate of 116%.
Overthe same period, general expenditures grew at an annual rate of less than
There are two additional facts worthy of note.First, the composition of
thenon—insurancetrustassetschangedsignificantlyoverthatdecade.
Whereas in 1977 29% of the assets were in short term cash and deposits, only
20%ofthe assets were held short term in 1987,Similarly holdings of state
and local government bonds fell from 8% to 3%.Holdings of federal securities
also fell from 26% to 21% while holdings on non-governmental securities rose
from 37 to 55%.
HousingFinanceAuthorityassetsmakeuponecomponentofthe
non-governmental securities category.Gold (1986) notes that Housing Finance
Authorities (HFAs) hold a large proportion of financial assets and that there
has been rapid growth in this category of assets since 1979.(Much of the
value of assets held by Housing Finance Authorities is the value of houses on
which mortgage loans have been written.In no sense do they represent
financial assets available to the Authorities.)The other major component of
this category is the state and local government holding of corporate bonds.
Unfortunately,itisnotclear whichoftheseassets predominateinthis
category since the Census data do not break out holdings of corporate bonds.
The Federal Reserve Board F'ow of Funds Balance Sheets do not help either.
The balance sheets incorrectly assume that the state and local sector holds no
corporate bonds, an error the Board of Governors is currentlycorrecting4.
Financial assets less the insurance trust assets grew at an annual rate of
14%,These are all nominal growth rates.
4Loansto the private sector may take other forms.The Street Journal
(Aug. 24,1987, p.25) reported that Louisville Ky. invested $5 million in
Small Business Administration backed business loans underwritten by local
banks.While the intention of this initiative was to promote local business,
it should be noted that these loans paid near—commercial loan rates to the
3There are two types of arbitrage that states can engage in which will
lead to an increase in financial asset holdingsFirst, states can borrow by
issuing municipal bonds, paying interest rate r, and then invest the proceeds
in higher yielding corporate or U.S. Treasury securities.This becomes more
attractivethegreatertheyieldspread betweentaxableandtaxexempt
securities.Iwillcallthisfinancial arbitrage.Alternatively,states can
raise taxes and invest the proceeds infinancial assets.The interest from
the investment is returned to taxpayers through lower taxes in the future,In
essence, states do the savings for their residents at the before—tax interest
rate; the arbitrage gain to this activity isr —(1—t)ror rE wheretisthe
marginal tax rate on interest income to taxpayers in the community.Iwill
call this saving arbitrage.
Section103(c)of theFederal Tax Codespecificallyprohibitsfinancial
arbitrage6.A fundamental problem with regulation of this form of arbitrage
isthe needtolinkbonds withspecificassets.Consider a statewhich
historically has paid for bridge construction through tax revenues and raises
a certain amount of taxes each year for "capital improvements".Then one
year, it issues a bond for bridge repair and uses the bond proceeds to fix the
bridge.The additional tax revenues that would have been used for bridge
repaircannowbeinvestedinanunrestrictedfashion.Clearly,with
sufficientlysophisticated(orintricate)bookkeeping1itwillbedifficult
for the IRS to prove that arbitrage is occurring.
city.
Gordon and Slemrod (1986) present a detailed explanation of the various
types of arbitrage activities in which communities can engage.Steuerle
(1985) also discusses tax and financial arbitrage at some length.
6After Tax Reform, the arbitrage rules are mainly collected into section
148.Metcalf (1988) describes the evolution of the arbitrage regulations in
detail.
4The IRS has never tried to prohibit saving arbitrage altogether, perhaps
partlyduetothedifficultiesinvolvedinmeasuringthesubstitutionof
community for individual saving and partly due to the lack of a general
principle which would motivatetheir concernSince thegainfromthis
activity is equal to rr,wewould expect states to increase their holdings of
financial assets as rt rises.However1 states with a mobile population should
be less inclined to undertake this activity since the residents who paid the
higher taxesinitially may not remain in the community to obtain the future
.8 benefits.
While simple in concept, saving arbitrage may require the co—operation of
many different individuals from different parts of government.Taxes must be
raised —involvinglegislativeaswellasadministrativeaction —and
investmentdecisionsmade.Thensome mechanism mustexisttotransfer
investment earnings to the General Fund in future years and to lower taxes by
an amount equal to the transferred funds.Such a degree of co—operation may
be difficult to imagine.However, saving arbitrage is not simply an academic
construct.The state tuition prepayment programs which have recently become
popular are clear examples of savingarbitrage9.
In the case of arbitrage bonds, the guiding principle was that these bonds
were a form of federal subsidy over which the federal government had no
control.From both efficiency and equity considerations, they were
in defensible.
8Mobility should be irrelevant if capitalization of the future tax savings
occurs in housing prices.However, capitalization depends on perfect
knowledge on the part of potential buyers of the property in the community.
While there exists empirical evidence in support of capitalization of local
taxes and services (viz Bloom, Ladd, and Yinger (1983)) it is hard to imagine
that potential buyers would have complete understanding of the savings
compact, especally at the state level.
The IRS agrees and has moved to taxtheincome accruing to these funds to




financial assets).Arbitrage opportunities certainly existin pension funds.
In fact,priortothe Tax Reform Act of1986,state and local governments
could issue tax exempt bonds and use the proceeds to purchase annuities for
their pension funds.However, there are a variety of complicating factors
which come into play when public sector pension funds are included in the
analysis.These include the composition and size of the public sector, the
bargainingpowerofpublicsectoremployees,andtheirattitudetoward
unfunded pension liabilities, among other things.
There exist additional reasons for states to hold financial assets beyond
arbitrage considerations.The buildup in financial assets may simply reflect
the conversion of non—financial assetsinto financial assets.Perhaps the
most important non—financial assets that governments hold are the future tax
claims on minerals still in the ground beneath the community or state.Given
the volatilityof mineral prices, tax smoothing considerationswould argue
for saving a large portion of severance tax revenues.A major source of
financial assets is the Permanent Funds —proceedsfrom severance taxes (the
two largest being Alaska and Texas),While these funds are important for
helping to explain the growth in financial assets in the late 1970s during a





evidence thatthestates accumulated surpluses partly as a result ofthe
emergence from a recession during which taxes had been raised and partly as a
result of a fall off in construction expenditures due to peculiar properties
6of the Public Works Employment Act of 1976.His first explanation suggests
that some measure of economic activity in a state (e.g. the unemployment rate)
should help explain asset holdings.
It is generally perceived that TRA86contains the strongest language yet
to control and curb arbitrage activity.The two major features of the law
which accomplish this are new volume caps and arbitrage rules'.°Prior to
TRA86, volume caps of $150 per capita existed for industrial development bonds
(IDBs)andstudentloanbonds.Now thereisauniform capformost
private—purpose bonds of $75 per capita or $250 million, whichever is greater;
the cap willfallto $50 per capita (or $150 million) at the end of1987.In
1984, $108.6 billion of new issue municipal bonds were underwritten; of this
amount, 31 percent would have fallen under the newly defined category of
private activity capped bonds, according to Petersen.
Tax reform should produce several offsettingeffects.First, thereis
likelytobe a sharp reduction inthe issue of private activity tax—exempt
bonds (mitigated to the extent that those bonds are repackaged in such a way
as to become categorized as "governmental purpose' and thus not subject to the
cap).Thiswilllimitarbitrageactivitybylimitingtheavailabilityof
municipaldebt.Second, theeliminationof many taxshelterswilllikely
increase the demand for municipal bonds, thereby driving rm down.However,
lower individual marginal tax rates should decrease the demand for municipal
bonds.The net effect on the yield spread is ambiguous.The evidence from
monthly rates on AAA rated general obligation municipa' bonds and 30 year
Treasury bonds indicates that the lower marginal tax rate effect dominates.
The average yield spread over the period from 1980 through 1985 is over 100
10See Petersen (1987) for a thorough discussion of the effect of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 on the municipa' bond market.
7basis points higher thanintheperiod from 1987 through June1988. CI
exclude 1986 for timing reasons.There was a massive surge of new issues in
1986 to avoid being subject to new regulations contained in Tax Reform.This
surge briefly drove the implicit taxonmunicipal bonds to zero.)
New arbitrageruleslimitthe amount of legal arbitragethat canbe
earned.Additionally,morestringentpenalties areimposedforarbitrage
violations.The effect of these restrictions should be to reduce the amount
of debt issue as a result of increases in the yield spread.But the new rules
do not affect incentives to issue "governmental purposedebt (which in1984
accounted for nearly 40% of new issues using the post—TRA86 definitions)to
replace taxes as a source of revenue forprojects.Hence,itisnot clear
thatarbitrageactivitiesastypifiedbythebridgeexamplewillbe
eliminated.
There has been verylittleresearch on the accumulation of financial
assets.The paper closeät in spirit to this one isa paper by Gordon and
Slemrod (1986) which examined data on 276 communities in4 of the 6 New
England states for the fiscal year ending in 1977.They find little evidence
of saving arbitrage and, because they lack data on municipal borrowing rates,
11 they present no evidence on the magnitude of financial arbitrage
While Gordon and Slemrod's paper accomplishes much, it suffers in several
respects.First,it assumes away financial arbitrage.Second, they examine a
period before the IRS implemented significant regulations which were intended
toshutoffthisformofactivity2Finally,theycannotcontrolfor
individualeffects('tastes"forassets,ifyouwill)usingonlyasingle
They assume that at the margin the IRS is able to enforce section 103(c).
12For example, there were few limits on the use of sinking funds to carry out
financial arbitrage.
8cross section of data.
III.EconometricModel and Data
The financial data for state governments used in this study are from the
Annual Survey of Government Finances conducted by the Census Bureau. Data on
revenues and expenditures as well as asset and debt composition are collected
from all state governments as well as a sample of local governments (town and
county governments,schooldistricts,etc.). Allfinancialvariablesarein
percapita,realdollars(1982dollarsusingtheCPI). Forthetaxable
interest rate, I use the rate on 20 year Treasury bonds as of the beginning of
the fiscal year.Icomputemunicipal interest rates (rm) based on Moody's
creditratingsforeachstate'sgeneralobligation(G.O.)debt(where
applicable) as published monthly in Moody's Record.Iuse the rating
that held at the beginning of the fiscal year.Moody assigns credit ratings
to many outstanding debt issues and also for most states assigns a rating to
apply to G.O. debt in general.However, not every state is assigned a rating,
many becausetheydonotissueG.O.debt(e.g.-Colorado).Inthe
econometric analysis,I exclude states which have no outstanding G.O. debt as
well as Alaska3Alaska is particularly troubling since it has financial asset
holdings per capita which are some14times thenational average.After
determining ratings for each state in each year,I assigned an interest rate
based on the average rate for that class for the month of July, which Moody's
also publishes.
Table1reports some summary statistics on interest rates.The mean
municipal rate rose from a low of 5.35% in 1977 to a peak of 12.02% in 1982.
The implicit municipal tax rate series, =(r_rm)/r,for the mean municipal
13The excluded states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
914 rateisclosetothe one reported by Poterba (1986) The key statistic
howeverisnot the implicit municipal tax rate but theyield spreaditself.
As the table shows, they can move in oppositedirections(viz1981—1982).
More importantly, a low implicit municipal tax rate does not imply a low yield
spread.In two of the three years when the yield spread exceeded 3 percentage
points, the implicit municipal tax rate was less than 26%.
Based on the discussion of the previous section,I estimated a model of
the form:




wherei runs from 1to N and t from 1 to T.Financial assets (At) in state i
in year t depend on the yield spread (S1), a measure of saving arbitrage, and
a vector of demographic and fiscal variables (Xt).Also (4) allows for fixed
effects(0.)aswellasmacroeconomic influencesnotspecifictoany one
community (c).
The tax variable(aswell as other tax variables discussed below) are
calculated using individual tax returns and the National Bureau of Economic





itemize(forsimplicity), then taxes can be raised1/(1—t), which only costs
14The implicit municipal tax rate is the tax rate which equates the after tax
yield on tax—exempt and taxable securities of equal riskiness.That is,the
tax rate is defined by equating (l_tm)r =r.
15The number of actual tax returns in each year varied from 76,561 in 1983 to
165,810 in 1979.
10the taxpayer1after deducting state taxes on her federal return.In future
years, r/(1—t)is returned through lower taxes which is only worth r, again
because of the federal deduction on state taxes.Itemization leads to greater
amounts of assetholdings.No attempt is made inthis paper toidentify
rigorously a "decisive" voter and whether she is an itemizer or not.Rather,
I assume that decisions are made through some voting/bargaining framework and
that itemizers and non—itemizers are both important.Therefore the proportion
of itemizers in each state should be positively correlated with asset and debt
holdings.
Demographic variables include the percentage of population aged 18 to -14,
and the percentage aged 65 and older.Fiscal variables include per capita tax
collections(lessseverancetaxcollections)andpercapitaseverancetax
collections.Also includedisthestate's average unemployment rate.In
summary, I have data on 40 states covering the fiscal years 1980 through 1986.
Table 2 presents some sample statistics describing the data.
Before discussing regression estimates, there are important simultaneity
issues which needtobe considered which may impartbiastocoefficient
estimates.First,thecreditratingofa communityisendogenousand
responsive (among other things)to changes in debt and asset levels.Also
there may be unobserved determinants of asset levels which also determine
credit ratings.Events or propensities which induce a community tohold
greater amounts of assets will likely lead to a higher credit rating and hence
lower borrowing costs. Or more directly, higher asset levels may leadtoa
higher credit rating and lower borrowing cost.Thisisless likely.Credit
ratings depend on a measure of net debt rather than any measure that includes
asset holdings.Moreover, thisdefinition ofnet debtissimply debt that
must be repaid out of the General Fund (as opposed to having an earmarked
revenuesource).Ineithercase,the coefficient on theyieldspreadis
11biased upward anditwillbedifficulttodistinguish whetherapositive
coefficient on thisvariableisdue to arbitrage activity ortosimultaneity
bias.
Offsetting this bias is bias due to opportunities for legal arbitrage and
the endogeneity of debt. Prior to TRA86, it was possible to hold roughly 15%
of the bond proceeds in a debt reserve fund'6.Therefore states with large
amounts of debt may be able to hold larger amounts of assets.However, the
larger debt islikelyto lower the government's credit rating.This effect
will bias the estimates downward.
Because of these problems, I employ an instrumental variables estimation
proceduretoestimateconsistentvaluesofthecoefficients,relyingfor
identification on the excluded variables from theunspecifiedcreditrating
determination and debt equations.I employ as instruments per capita income
in the state, tax capacity and taxeffortindices as measured by the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmentai Relations (ACIR)'7 and the percentage of taxes
raised by the largest tax. The first three instruments are reasonably measures
ofthefiscal well—beingof astate which should affectitscreditrating.
Also, because tax revenues are included in the regression, I would not expect
thattheerrorintheregression equation wouldbecorrelatedwiththe
instruments.Thelastinstrument measurestheextenttowhich astate
diversifies its tax collections.This measure should be correlated positively
with the municipal rate; again there is no reason to expect that it would be
correlated with the error in the regression equation.(For a discussion of
thedeterminationof a community's creditrating,seeRubinfeld(1973)or
16Assets could be held in debt reserve funds, debt service funds and
temporary funds.See Metcalf (1988) for more details.
17Tax capacity is the amount of taxes a state could collect ifit applied an
average set of rates to its tax base. Tax effort is the ratio of actual tax
collections to tax capacity.
12Aronson and Marsden (1980).)A complete model wouldlink the financing
decisions with the tax and spending decisions.I assume here that the tax
variables, while endogenous, are uncorrelated with the error term in the asset
equations. Sinceunanticipatedtaxcollectionsleaddirectlytohigher
financial asset holding, this is not an unreasonable assumption.
Aswritten,equation(7)allowsforfixedeffects.Ignoringthese
parameters creates no bias so long as the effects are uncorrelated with any
included variables.As in most empirical studies inatate and local public
finance, this is unlikely to hold (viz Holtz—Eakin (1986)).
IV. Results
Table 3 presents estimation results for the model in equation1above.
All of the regressions have per capita real financial assets (net of insurance
trust assets) on the left hand side.Fixed effects and year dummies are not
reported in the table.The rirst regression ignores the endogeneity in the
determinationofthestate'screditrating.The coefficientontheyield
spread variableis positive and significant at the 95% level suggesting the
responsiveness of financial assets to movements inthe yieldspread.The
effect of changes in the yield spread is important.A one standard deviation
move in the yield spread implies an increase in financialassets of $70 per
capita, 9% ofthe mean holdings across the 40states over the seven year
period.
None of the other variables in the regression are significaxit (other than
year and state dummies).The data provide no support for savings arbitrage.
Thecoefficientsontheinteresttaxwedgevariable(rr)andfraction
itemizersvariableare actuallynegative, contrarytotheory, andentirely
insignificant.Aside from thepracticaldifficultiesof engaging insavings
arbitrage at the state level, there arestatisticaldifficulties.Changes in
these two variables are closely linked to changes inthe federal tax code.
13Much ofthe variationinthesedataislikelytobe captured intheyear
effects.
The trade off involved in estimating fixed effects models is apparent in
the significance of the other coefficients.Most of the variation in the tax
variables and the demographics variables is across states rather than within
states acrosstime.Infact,for these four variables, the fraction ofthe
total variance in the variables accounted for within states across time never
exceeds 15%.In contrast 36% of the variance in the unemployment rateis
within states across time while nearly 90% of the variance in the yield spread
variable is within states across time.
The unemployment and lagged unemployment rate variables were included in
the regression to test for Gramlich's hypothesis that surpluses accumulate as
states emerge from recessions due to lags instate law tax changes.This
hypothesis suggests that the coefficient on the unemployment ratevariable
should benegative.Current unemployment comesinpositive and lagged
unemployment negative, albeit with a t statistic of one'8.
Theremainingregressionsintable 3areinstrumentalvariable
regressions to control for the endogeneity in the credit rating (and hence the
yield spread variable).The second regression is thefull model.Nothing
qualitatively changes from the OLS regressions except for the magnitude of the
coefficient on the yield spread variable.Itincreases to673.11 and while
the standard error increases,itisstillsignificant —nowat the 99% level.
The positive coefficient on theyield spread variableisnot duetocredit
ratingagenciesgivinghigherratingstostateswithlargeamountsof
financial assets19.The final regression drops all of the variables from the
18The regression was run with variants on which unemployment variables are
included in the regression.The results do not change appreciably.
19This raises the issue though of the proper treatment of debt.As a first
14regression except theyieldspread variable and theyear dummies.The
magnitude of the yield spread effects drops somewhat but isstill significant
at the 95% level20.
Aswithallinstrumentalvariableregressions,itisimportantto
consider the exogeneity of the instruments.One could make a reasonable
argument that thetaxeffort variableiscorrelatedwith theerrorinthe
equation.A shock to the local economy which drives down asset holdings might
also be relatedtothe effort that a community makes to raise taxes.The
correlationwouldlikelybenegativesincetaxeffortwouldprobablybe
increased due to an increased need for transfers and a diminished tax base. A
similar argument would suggest a positive correlation between the shock and
tax capacity. Iattempt to control for this type of correlation by including
tax collectionsin the regression so that this shockisnot incorporated in
the error term.Hausman and Taylor (1981b) suggest a variant on the Hausman
Specification Test which can test for the appropriateness of my control (see
their paper for a more precise formulation of the statistic).Icompute the
statistic under the assumption that the variable measuring the proportion of
taxes raised by the largest tax is an admissible instrument for the municipal
rate.The chi—square statistic will have one degree of freedom.Ifirst test
for the admissibility of each instrument separately and then test them as a
group,The highest chi—square statistic occurs in the test of tax capacity
(.68) but iswell below the10 percent significance cut off point.This test
effort to control for the legal arbitrage opportunities,Iran a regression in
which I assumed that states always invest 15% of their debt proceeds for the
life of the bond.The dependent variable then is financial assets less 15% of
outstanding debt.While the regression estimate falls by $100 per capita, it
isstillquitesubstantial andstillsignificant atthe 95%level.
20A Wald test for dropping the eight variables from the regression is not
rejected.The test statistic is 7.22 and is distributed as a Chi Square
random variable with 8 degrees of freedom (See Engle (1984) for a derivation
of this test.)
15can also be used to check for endogeneity of the yield spread variable.Under
the assumption that the yield spread is exogenous, the OLS regression can be
interpreted as the efficient IV estimator for the purposes of thetest.I
compare theIVestimatorwithallfourinstrumentsincludedtothe OLS
estimator.The teststatisticis4.82 and exceeds thecriticalvalue fora
chi square statistic with one degree of freedom at the 95% level.
LConclusion
This paper has shown that there may be significant marginal arbitrage
effects due to the yield spread between taxable and tax—exempt interest rates.
For fiscal year 1986, the standard deviation of the yield spread across the
forty state sample was 0.17.Based on the IV regression estimates from Table
3,thisimplies a difference infinancial asset holdings of$114 percapita,
14% of the mean financial asset holdings across the states in the seven year
sample.As in Gordon and Slemrod's paper, there is no evidence of savings
arbitrage.Clearly one area for further research would be to replicate this
analysis for a large panel of local governments from the Annual Survey of
Government Finances.Besides the greater number of observations, this would
provide opportunitiestocontraststatelevelbehaviortolocal government
behavior.
The regression results suggest that the Tax Reform Act will not eliminate
arbitrage activity by municipal governments.We should expect that the trend
towardprivateactivitytax—exempt bondswillbereversedwithgreater
reliance now on governmental activity municipals21.These bondswillstill
provide opportunities for arbitrage.
21This is borne out by the evidence on new debt issues in calendar year 1986.
issues of private activity municipal bonds fell dramatically while new issues
of public purpose debt rose.As in previous years, a large amount of
borrowing occurs toward the end of the calendar year and is reflected in
fiscal year 1987 totals, not in the data employed in this study (Statistics of
Income, Summer 1988).
16If financial arbitrage isto be eliminated, some other approach will have
tobetaken.The obvious approach,totaxmunicipal bondinterest,is
unlikely to be taken.There isstrong political support for the exemption.
Another approach that deserve considerations is a first dollar arbitrage rule.
Here, unrestricted yields could only be earned on an amount of assets equal to
the net financial holdings of a community.This rule, in effect, broadens the
concept ofreplacement andeliminates theneedtocreatea linkbetween
specific debt obligations and assetholdings2.2While a more detailed analysis
of this proposal would be necessary, one effect of this approach to arbitrage
might be to induce state and local governments to fund more of their unfunded
pension liabilities.
Questions about marginal arbitrage activity relate to the larger question
of the determinants of the yield spread between taxable and tax—exempt rates.
Explanations ofthe spread have traditionally concentrated on demand side
theories attempting to identify the marginal investor in tax-exempt bonds (see
Poterba for a description).The supply sidestories may be an important
determinant aswell.Highlevelsofassetaccumulationdueinpartto
arbitrage may help explain the low implicit municipal taxrate observed in
recent years.
22Henry Simons (1938) notes that Andrew Mellon proposed this idea in 1923 to
curtail individual arbitrage activity (investing borrowed funds for which a
tax deductionhas been takenin municipal bonds).
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The yield spread and implicit municipal tax rate are based on the
mean value of the municipal rate and the rate on 20 year Treasury
bonds.N 40.
20Table 2. Sample Statistics on
Regression Data
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Financial 80120 559.69 174.74 3633.00
Assets
Municipal Rate 9.09 1.94 5.58 12.99
Taxable Rate 1171 1.95 8.78 14.06
YieldSpread 2.61 0.63 1.07 3.67
Severance 32.46 67.49 0.00 277.81
Taxes
Taxes 707.67 183.95 304.34 1235.66
Interest 1,98 0.51 0.72 3.28
Tax Wedge
Proportion 33.04 7.27 13.81 50.04
of Itemizers
Percentage 42.25 1.76 36.80 46.90
Aged 18—44
Percentage 11.45 1.76 7.50 17.60
Aged 65+
Unemployment 7.85 2.36 2.80 18.00
Rate
Ins truiDen ts:
Per capita 10.64 1.59 7.23 15.93
Income (xl000)
Largest Tax 39.37 9.58 20.45 66.30
as Percentage
of Taxes
Tax Capacity 97.82 16.02 68.00 154.00
Tax Effort 96.95 19.18 60.00 171.00
Number of Observations: 280
21Table 3. Regression Estimates:
Dependent Variable: Financial Assets.
(1) (2) (3)
Regression OLS IV IV
Yield 111.88 673.11 458.43
Spread (49.94) (260.38) (214.27)
Severance 0.71 0,64 —
Taxes (0.53) (0.66)
Taxes 0.15 O24 -
(0.19) (0.24)
Interest —0.66 —0.77 —
TaxWedge (0.99) (1.24)
Proportion —0.37 1.88 —
ofItemizers (3.81) (4.86)
Percentage —49.34 —37.68 —
Aged18—44 (34.41) (43.33)
Percentage 1.28 74.15 —
Aged65 + (48.03) (68.41)
Unemployment 15.14 20.00 —
Rate (10.15) (12.87)
tagged —9.16 —2.94 —
Unemployment (9.22) (11.86)
Adjusted 0.96 0.94 0.95
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Number of Observations: 280.
Regressions include fixed effects and year dummies.Year dummies are always
significantly different than zero.Full regression outputs are available on
request from the author.
22